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RECENT DECISIONS
pretation, the Montana court could be expected to reach a result contrary
to that of the present case.
Perhaps a contrary result is conceivable,' but it would appear much
more likely that the Montana court would follow the instant case. This is
because the Kansas court which rendered that decision itself adheres to the
modern liberal trend," and because every limitation statute using the word
accident which has been construed, with the exception of Nebraska's, has
been held to require that the period of limitation begins to run from the
happening of the accident. Thus it would seem that although the acts are
to be liberally construed, when a court is confronted with the word accident
there is no room for construction and that holding accident to mean mani-
festation of injury would be unwarranted judicial legislation."
That courts generally construe limitation statutes using injury to refer,
to manifestation of injury furnishes no authority for a statute which reads
accident, since injury refers to effect while accident refers to occurrence.
The issue here involved has not yet been litigated in Montana,' but the
probability of a result like that in the instant case should be avoided by leg-
islative action, substituting the word injury or discovery of injury for the
word accident in Montana's limitation statute. No workman should be
denied relief merely because the injury he receives is not discoverable at
the outset, if it later appears and causes a disability the act was intended
to make compensable.
JOHN P. ACHER.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - EFFECT OF POST-INJURY WAGES ON
ELIGIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS -PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
WHILE INELIGIBLE TO DRAW PAYMENTS--In December, 1948, claimant suf-
fered an industrial accident. After filing a timely claim for compensation,
be continued working at full pay until July, 1952. In October, 1953, the
Montana Industrial Accident Board heard and denied the claim but was re-
a need for liberal construction in order to effectuate the humane purpose of the
legislation.
In Yurkovich v. Industrial Accident Board, 314 P.2d 866 (Mont. 1957), an em-
ployee was injured and requested from the Industrial Accident Board information
on procedure to be followed in obtaining compensation. The Board failed to In-
form him of the necessity of filing a claim under oath. The workman did not file
a claim until later when he became aware of this requirement, after the statutory
period had expired. The court allowed compensation, stating that the Industrial Ac-
cident Board stands in a fiduciary relationship to the injured workmen, and will
not be heard to assert the running of the time limitation when Its own inaction
caused the claim to be filed too late.
"Keenan v. Consumers Public Power District, 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
"In fact, in 1944 the words "injury arising by accident" were construed by that court
to include injury sustained in the performance of usual tasks performed In the
usual manner even though there be no event In the nature of an outside or Interven-
ing cause. Murphy v. I.C.U. Const. Co., 158 Kan. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944). With
this compare Murphy v. Anaconda Company, 321 P.2d 1094 (Mont 1958).
"See the language of the Idaho Supreme Court In Moody v. State Highway Depart-.
ment, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1008, 1110 (1935), set out In the text at note 10 supra.
"But note the reference in Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 324 P.2d 1063. 1064
(Mont. 1958), 19 MONTANA L. REv. 173 (1958), to a distinction between "accident"
and "Injury."
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versed by the Montana Supreme Court, which awarded "such compensation
as is provided by statute."' The Board then awarded compensation for a
period of 500 weeks commencing as of July, 1952. Claimant petitioned for
rehearing, contending that payment should be made commencing as of the
date of accident (1948) rather than from the date claimant's employment
and salary terminated in 1952. Rehearing was denied. In the district
court the issues were resolved in favor of the claimant. On appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed. A claimant is not entitled to com-
pensation payments until the date he suffers actual monetary loss from in-
ability to work due to the accident. Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board,
324 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1958).
This decision changes Montana law with regard to the effect of post-
injury wages on eligibility for compensation payments. The former rule
was that announced in Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co.' Shaffer
was injured in a fall from a loading dock and after a brief hospitalization
he returned to work at the same salary as he earned prior to his injury.
The Board denied his claim for partial disability compensation giving as
its reason that the "claimant has failed to show any loss of earnings as re-
quired by the statute." The Supreme Court upheld the decision for failure
of proof but with respect to the ruling of the Board requiring monetary loss
said:
The board seemingly took the view that since claimant re-
ceived as much or more from his employer after the injury as be-
fore, that fact precluded any recovery because claimant failed to
show any loss of earnings. The test, however, is not whether there
has been a loss of earnings or income caused by the injury, but
rather has there been a loss of earning capacity-a loss of ability
to earn in the open labor market.
The board was in error in determining that claimant's rights
were dependent upon a showing of loss of earnings rather than
upon a showing of loss of ability to earn.' (Emphasis added).
The "earning capacity" test of the Shaffer case is abstract. Its applica-
tion requires that evidence be taken of all the factors which will in the fu-
ture influence the ability of the claimant to make a living, either at his
former trade, or at another to which he might become adapted. The inquiry
under the Shaffer case is not concluded by a finding that the claimant is
still drawing the same pay as before the accident. On the other hand, the
test applied by the court in the instant case is concrete. If the claimant is
in fact earning as much after the accident as before, the issue is foreclosed;
he is not entitled to compensation payments.
The abstract standard of the Shaffer case is applied by the majority
of states which have passed on .the question and there are strong arguments
'Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256 (1955).
'127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953). An intermediate case is Greenfield v. Indus-
trial Accident Board, 320 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1958), where the Board applied the
rule later affirmed in the instant case and the court failed to reverse though it
stated the abstract test of the Shaffer case. Counsel in the Greenfield case con-
ceded the issue in his brief, probably unintentionally.
id. at 341-42.
[Vol. 19,
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in its favor.' Yet, in view of the policy of the compensation statutes to pro-
vide certainty in measuring recovery, a more workable rule is provided by
the instant case. Computing the award under this rule is a matter of sim-
ple arithmetic and litigation over the amount of an award will be reduced.
Under the Shaffer rule many difficult evidentiary problems would be pre-
sented, both before the Board and before the courts on appeal, and much
of the evidence offered would necessarily be speculative in nature.
Though rigid, the new rule appears fair to both the employer and em-
ployee. As to the employer or insurance carrier, the losses which will be
incurred for injuries are predictable because they are influenced by only
one factor rather than the vague and unreliable criteria of the Shaffer
case. Fairness to the employee requires only that his right to payments
be preserved for the possible contingency that his condition degenerates and
causes him financial loss. It does not require that he be paid compensation
in addition to his regular wage. The compensation acts are designed to
protect the worker and his family from the insecurity caused by industrial
hazard, and this is as well done by the new rule as by the Shaffer rule.
Deferring payments until the workman has suffered monetary loss
will not impair his right to compensation should the need arise. The claim-
ant is required to notify the employer or the insurance carrier within sixty
days of the accident and within a year he must file a claim." Upon complet-
ing these preliminary steps, he may wait to see what development takes
place in his disability. So long as these actions are taken within the re-
quired time, the claim is never outlawed.' In the instant case there was a
four year interval between the filing of the claim and the first hearing. In
most cases the injury will manifest itself much sooner than it did here, but
nevertheless there is no necessity to press the claim until it does.
Delaying the commencement of the payments will not cause the em-
ployee to lose any of the total amount he is entitled to collect. Although
the statutes say there shall be no payment made after 500 weeks from the
"date of injury,'" in the instant case the court read "injury" as a word
of art and found the "date of injury" for this purpose to be the date on
which the claimant ceased to draw his regular salary.! This avoids an in-
ternal contradiction in the statutes, for they also say that the compensa-
tion "shall be paid during the period of disability.'' Under the court's
'For an extensive treatment of this subject in general see Ann., 149 A.L.R. 413
(1944).
RssED CoDEs OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 92-601, 92-S07. For a discussion of a problem
raised by these sections, see Recent Decision at 172 supra.
'The four year limitation within which the Board may modify final orders as pro-
vided by section 92-826, R.C.M. 1947, does not apply to the contemplated case since
no orders will have been entered at all.
7REvsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 92-702: "Such compensation shall be paid dur-
ing the period of disability, but for the period not exceeding five hundred (500)
weeks from the date of injury." Section 92-703 provides: "such compensation shall
be paid during the period of disability not exceeding, however, five hundred (500)
weeks in cases of permanent partial disability .. " For the present purpose there
would appear to be no tenable distinction between partial and total disability. The
basic concept is the same for awarding payments under either situation.
For another situation in which courts treat the word injury as a term of art, see
Recent Decision at 171 supra.
'REvisED CoDEs or MONTANA, 1947, §§ 92-702, 92-703.
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construction, the 500 week limitation in conjunction with the prescribed
weekly amounts is only a method of expressing the maximum monetary total
of the payments provided by the act. Because of this approach to the prob-
lem, a claimant is safe in waiting until his disability has cost him all
or part of his salary before pressing his claim, so long as he files his claim
and notice within the statutory period.
The court has in the instant decision rejected the abstract test of
"earning capacity" established in the Shaffer case; in the future it will
look to the wages which the disabled employee is actually bringing home
each week and compute his award on that basis. If the claimant has not
suffered an immediate diminution of earnings it is possible to preserve his
right to compensation until such time as he needs the money. The decision
which makes this possible is a step forward in the certain, and therefore
sound, administration of the workmen's compensation law of Montana.
CRESAP McCRACKEN
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